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RATIONALIZING LIABILITY FOR NONDISCLOSURE
UNDER lOB-5: EQUAL ACCESS TO INFORMATION
AND UNITED STATES V. CHIARELLA.
INTRODUCTION

When Congress passed the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 1
(the "Exchange Act") it created a far-reaching mechanism for regulating the sale of securities to private investors. In implementing one
of the major provisions of the Act-:-Section 10(b)2-the Securities
and Exchange Commission (the "Commission") promulgated rule
lOb-5. 3 Rule lOb-5 is a broad anti-fraud provision that prohibits
affirmative misrepresentations and half-truths in connection with
the purchase or sale of a security. Although the rule does not expressly proscribe nondisclosure, and though under the common law
mere nondisclosure could not form the basis for a deceit action, 4
1. Pub . L. No. 291, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (current version at 15 U.S.C . §§ 78a-kk (1976)).
For a detailed discussion of this statute see Loomis, The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and
the Investment Advisor's Act of 1940, 28 GEO. WASH . L. REV. 214 (1959) .
2. Codified at 15 U.S .C. § 78j(b) (1976) . This provision provides that:
It shall be unlawful for any person directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange-

(b) To use or employ in connection with the purchase or sale of any security .
any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules
and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors.
3. Rule lOb-5 was first adopted by the Commission in May 1942. III L. Loss, SECURITIES
REGULATION 1426 (2d ed . 1961). It is presently codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5 (1979) and
states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary to make, the statements made, in the light of the circumstance under
which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in an act, practice or course of business which operates as a fraud or
deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
For discussion of the rule, see III Loss, supra , at 1421-74, VI id. at 3526-70; A. BROMBERG,
SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD-SEC RULE lOb-5 (1974) .
4. See W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS§ 101 (4th ed . 1971). See also R. JENNINGS & H.
MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION 946 (4th ed . 1977) . For other discussions of the problem of pure
nondisclosure see Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, An Initial Inquiry into the Responsibility
to Disclose Market Information, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 798, 802-03 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Fleischer, An Initial Inquiry J; Fleischer, Securities Trading and Corporate Information Practices: The Implications of the Texas Gulf Sulphur Proceeding, 51 VA. L. REV. 1271, 12'.7
(1965) [hereinafter cited as Fleischer, Securities Trading]; Jennings, Insider Trading tn
Corporate Securities: A Survey of Hazards and Disclosure Obligations Under Rule JOb-5, 62
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both the courts and the Commission have construed it as imposing
liability on purchasers and sellers for nondisclosure in certain situations.5
When the courts and the Commission first interpreted the
scope of liability for nondisclosure under the rule, they focused on
the defendant's status as a corporate insider-whether the defendant was an officer or director of the corporation whose securities
were being traded-and on the type of information allegedly withheld. In later cases, the courts and the Commission expanded liability by broadening both the category of persons with a duty to disclose6 and the nature of the information required to be disclosed.
Recently, the Second Circuit in United States u. Chiarella 7
abandoned an approach based on the defendant's status as an insider and held that anyone, whether an insider or not, who regularly
receives nonpublic material information, must disclose that information or abstain from trading. 8 The court imposed this expanded
disclosure obligation in order to effectuate what it saw as the federal
regulatory policy of providing equal access to information necessary
for investors to make reasonable and intelligent decisions. 9
Nw. U.L. REV. 809, 815 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Jennings, Insider Trading); Koeltl &
Longstreth, Market Information Revisited, 11 REV. SEC. REG. 843 (1978).
5. The courts and the Commission's willingness to impose liability for nondisclosure
shows their refusal to be bound by traditional common-law elements of a deceit action in
interpreting the statutory prohibition against deceit. See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co., 401F.2d833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en bane) , cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969) (corporate insiders
had a duty to disclose information or abstain from trading); Rogen v. Illikon, 361 F.2d 260
(1st Cir. 1966) (where plaintiff, the former president of the corporation, sold his stock to the
corporation and the corporation had knowledge about the revival of negotiations with a
potential purchaser and about technological progress on a key project but did not reveal it to
the plaintiff, held that the alleged nondisclosure raised a material fact precluding summary
judgment for the defendants); Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951)
(controlling shareholder purchasing shares from minority stockholder had a duty to disclose
the greatly appreciated inventory value which was not revealed in the annual report, and the
intent to liquidate the corporation, enabling it to capture that appreciation); Kardon v.
National Gypsum Co., 73 F . Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947) (defendants, directors of corporation
purchasing shares from plaintiffs, had a duty to disclose fact that they had arranged for the
sale to a third corporation for a price higher than t he book value offered to plaintiff). But see
List v. Fashion Park, Inc. , 340 F .2d 457 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1975) (no duty
of insider purchasing stock from minority stockholder to disclose the fact that the company
had a potential purchaser on the horizon when that court concluded that plaintiffs would
have sold the stock even if the information had been disclosed); Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319
F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963) (no duty by the company accountant negotiating t he purchase of the
stock to disclose details of pension plan or accounting methoa of annuities funding to stockholder who had years of acquaintance with the company).
6. See Note, SEC u. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., The Inside and Outside of Rule JOb-5, 46
B.U.L. REV. 205, 210 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Note, SEC u. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. I.
7. 588 F.2d 1358 (2d Cir. 1978) , cert. granted, 99 S. Ct. 2158 (1979) . See also text
accom panying notes 104-06 infra.
8. Chiarella, 588 F.2d at 1365.
9. Judge Kaufman stated that "The draftsmen of our nation's securities laws, rejecting
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Chiarella was an employee of a financial printer who worked on
documents for use by tender offerors. By successfully decoding the
documents, Chiarella identified the parties involved and, on the
basis of that confidential market information, placed orders with his
broker. Notwithstanding Chiarella's noninsider status, the Second
Circuit upheld his criminal 10 conviction for violating rule lOb-5. 11
Chiarella provided the Second Circuit with an opportunity to
resolve an important issue on which there previously had been no
square holding: 12 whether a person who is not an insider and has no
inside knowledge about the company whose securities he is trading
nevertheless has a duty to disclose nonpublic material information
in his possession about impending stock market events. 13 The court
viewed such a person as a "market insider" 14 and found a duty to
disclose. To evaluate the propriety of imposing liability in this situation, this comment will first trace the development and expansion
of liability for nondisclosure under rule lOb-5. Section I concludes
the philosophy of caveat emptor, created a system of providing equal access to information
necessary for reasoned and intelligent investment decisions." Id. at 1362.
10. Chiarella contended that he could not be convicted criminally for two reasons. First,
he argued that he lacked adequate notice of the conduct proscribed. In finding that Chiarella
had adequate notice, the court relied partly on publicity surrounding a consent decree entered
into for conduct substantially similar to Chiarella's, see SEC v. Sorg Printing Co., (19741975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 95,034 (S.D.N.Y . 1975), and partly on signs
at Chiarella's own company prohibiting the conduct in which he later engaged, see Chiarella,
588 F.2d at 1369.
Chiarella's other defense to the criminal charges was that he lacked the requisite intent
to support a criminal conviction. Id. at 1370. The Second Circuit found the necessary intent
on the basis of the trial court's finding that Chiarella acted knowingly and willfully, rejecting
the defendant's contention that the government had to go farther and prove a specific intent
to defraud in order to support a criminal conviction . Id.
Although criminal liability on these facts is not very compelling, this comment will not
focus on the criminal liability but on the scope of civil liability under rule lOb-5. Since
Chiarella was not within a category of persons known as corporate insiders, on whom the
courts had imposed broad disclosure duties, the initial and critical issue in the case was
whether and on what grounds such persons could be liable for nondisclosure. The criminal
issue, by contrast, is somewhat less interesting doctrinally. It turns on the issue of whether,
assuming liability, the facts would support a criminal conviction . The comment concludes
that since Chiarella's conduct clearly falls within the scope of lOb-5, he should be found to
have violated lOb-5 even if the criminal conviction is ultimately reversed either for a lack of
sufficient notice or of the requisite scienter.
11. Chiarella was convicted on 17 criminal counts of misuse of material nonpublic
information under§§ lO(b) and 32(a) of the Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), 78ff(a)
and rule lOb-5 . After the jury convicted him on every count, the defendant moved to dismiss
on the ground that no crime was charged . Chiarella, 588 F.2d at 1364. For a report of the
district court's denial of the motion, see United States v. Chiarella, 450 F. Supp. 95 (S .D.N .Y.
1978) . The appeal to the Second Circuit followed the district court's denial of the motion to
dismiss.
12. See JENNINGS & MARSH, supra note 4, at 953.
13. See note 95 infra.
14. Chiarella, 588 F.2d at 1365.
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that although most of the cases tie the duty to disclose to the defendant's insider status, they can plausibly be read in terms of an
underlying regulatory principle of equal access to information. To
test this hypothesis, Section I then examines cases involving outsiders who, since they owe no fiduciary duty to the shareholders of an
issuer's securities, would have no duty to disclose absent another
principle.
Section II of the comment then turns to the legislative history
of the Exchange Act to determine if it supports an equal access
principle. Section II finds, as did the case law prior to Chiarella,
that legislative history fails to provide definitive support for an
equal access principle. The comment concludes in Section III, however, that strong policy reasons favor adoption of such a principle.
In section IV the comment focuses on the Chiarella opinion,
which adopted the principle of equal access and created a test to
effectuate it. The comment concludes by endorsing Chiarella's
adoption of the principle, criticizing the test adopted, proposing an
alternative one for defining the scope of liability, and exploring its
application in a variety of nondisclosure situations involving outsiders.
I.

STATUS AND FIDUCIARY CONCEPTS AND THE AFFIRMATIVE DUTY TO
DISCLOSE

A.

Introduction

A major theme in the rule's interpretive history concerns the
narrow definition of fraud as affirmative misrepresentations and
half-truths-but not absolute silence. 15 Despite this literal meaning,
15. The rule by its terms imposes no penalties for mere silence. Clause (b) of the rule,
see note 3 supra, refers to omissions to state material facts which are necessary to make
statements already made not misleading. Thus, under a literal reading, if no statements are
made there would be no liability . Likewise, clauses (a) and (c) covering devices, schemes or
practices which are intended to defraud apparently require no affirmative disclosure . See
JENNINGS & MARSH, supra note 4, at 946.
By defining fraud in terms of affirmative acts, rule lOb-5 followed the common law which
imposes no penalties for mere silence. See notes 4-6 supra and accompanying text. But see
note 16 infra. See also Chasins v. Smith, Barney & Co. , 438 F.2d 1167, 1172 (2d Cir. 1971)
(where customer relied on broker's recommendation and broker failed to reveal his market
maker status, the court thought the requirement of reliance properly one of tort "causation
in fact") . In cases of pure nondisclosure the Supreme Court held positive proof of reliance
was not required. See_Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, rehearing denied,
408 U.S. 931 (1972); Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 374, 384 (1970) . See also SEC
v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968). For cases following the Affiliated Ute
approach, see Cameron v. Adams Co., 547 F.2d 473 (9th Cir. 1976); Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974); Reeder v. Master Craft Electronics
Corp., 363 F. Supp . 574, 581(S .D.N.Y.1974) (reliance requirement has little relevance where
plaintiff bought shares on the open market).
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the courts and the Commission, wishing to extend liability to those
who bought or sold a security without disclosing material information, created a duty to disclose in certain situations where no affirmative misrepresentation had been made. 16
In interpreting the scope of the rule, the courts and the Commission have predicated liabilty for nondisclosure on a fiduciary
duty inherent in a defendant's status as an insider in the corporation whose securities he is trading. This doctrinal reliance on the
elements of status and fiduciary duty stems from the fact that the
rule was interpreted against a background of the common law, 17
There has been a similar erosion of the requirement of privity . In Joseph v. Farnsworth
Radio & Television Corp., 99 F. Supp. 701 (S.D.N .Y. 1951), aff'd, 198 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1952)
the court held that there must be a "semblance of privity" between plaintiff and defendant.
Id. at 706. Two recent cases have followed the Farnsworth holding. See Fridrich v. Bradford,
542 F .2d 307 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977); Imperial Supply Co. Profit
Sharing Trust v. Northern Ohio Bank, 430 F. Supp. 339 (N.D . Ohio 1976) . But several cases
have allowed plaintiffs to recover as long as they could prove that they were trading during
the period of the misrepresentation. Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1975) ; Sargent
v. Genesco, Inc., 492 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1974).
In contrast to the relaxation of the requirements of privity and reliance, some proof of
scienter is generally still required. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976),
where the United States Supreme Court held that some proof of scienter was an essential
precondition to a civil action for damages under the anti-fraud provisions of the Exchange
Act, but left open the question whether reckless conduct would be sufficient scienter for
imposing liability. For cases holding that recklessness may suffice, see Sanders v. John
Nuveen & Co., 554 F.2d 790 (7th Cir. 1977); Sunstrand Corp. v. Sun Chemical Corp., 553
F.2d 1033 (7th Cir. 1977).
The erosion of the common-law elements of a deceit action as requisite for the imposition
of liability is significant because it indicates that in order to effectuate the purposes of the
rule, courts may be willing to relax some of the formal common law requirements. A similar
pattern is reflected in the courts' willingness to go beyond strict common-law fiduciary notions and impose liability under the rule even in cases where not all the elements of a fiduciary
relation are present, as in the case of corporate outsiders. See notes 20-61 infra and accompanying text.
16. Even before the Exchange Act was passed or the rule promulgated, courts occasionally interpreted the duty to disclose expansively and found liability for nondisclosure absent
affirmative misrepresentations. A case in which the United States Supreme Court held that
although officers and directurs did not have a duty as such, but special circumstances required disclosure, was Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909). In that case the Court held that
where the agent purchased shares from a stockholder for a defendant who had exclusive
knowledge of an impending sale to the government, the failure to disclose that information
amounted to a fraud sufficient to void the sale. Id . at 431-32. The Commission and the courts
have continued to follow Repide in finding a duty to disclose even in the absence of any
express liability for nondisclosure. See text accompanying notes 20-64 infra.
17. It was natural for judges to look to common-law concepts, for "[s ]tatutes build on
the common law and, especially when statutes are new, judges and lawyers who are trained
in the common law are apt to look to it for guidance." III Lo~<> . supra note 3, at 1430. The
courts looked particularly to the common law of the tort of deceit in developing the elements
of a lOb-5 cause of action. Common-law deceit requires proof of: (1) a false representation;
(2) knowledge or belief that the representation is false or the defendant's lack of a sufficient
basis of information to make the representation (scienter); (3) an intention to induce the
plaintiff to act or to refrain from so acting; (4) justifiable reliance by the plaintiff; and (5)
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which suggested that the positions of officers and directors carry
with them a fiduciary duty to the corporation 18 and to its shareholders.19
This section of the comment will attempt to demonstrate that,
although the courts and the Commission initially defined liability
or lack thereof in terms of the convenient concepts of status and
fiduciary duty, a policy of equal access to material information may
have provided the real ground for imposing liability.
B.

From the Inside Out: Historical Expansion of the Duty to Disclose and the Idea of Equal Access
1.

OFFICERS, DIRECTORS, AND CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDERS

The first persons whom the courts held to an affirmative duty to
disclose were corporate officers and directors. In Kardon v. National
Gypsum Co. 20 certain officers and directors of a corporation were
found to have violated rule lOb-5 even though they had made no
affirmative misrepresentations or half truths.
The two plaintiffs and the two defendants in the case owned all
the stock in a corporation in which they were the corporate officers.
Without the plaintiffs' knowledge, the defendants agreed to sell the
plant and equipment to another corporation and then purchased all
dam ages based on such reliance. See PROSSER, supra note 4, § 5 at 685-86.
In defining the nature and scope of of a lOb-5 fraud action, however, the courts were not
narrowly bound by the common law of deceit, and gave recovery even where the plaintiff was
unable to prove one or more of these elements. For example, although early cases required
proof of reli ance as prerequisite to recovery under rule lOb-5, see List v. Fashion Park, Inc.,
340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S . 811 (1975), "(r]ecent case law supports the
proposition that proof of reliance is unnecessary when the deception involves nondisclosure
rather than misrepresentation ." Note, The Reliance Requirement in Private Actions Under
SEC Rule JOb-5, 88 HARV. L. REV. 584, 591 (1975) .
18. It made sense to impose the duty to disclose on corporate insiders, because they
were likely to have access to material nonpublic information. Examples include knowledge
about such specific events as a change in dividend policy, Cochran v. Channing Corp ., 211
F. Supp. 239 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); a stock split, Hafner v. Forest Laboratories, Inc., 345 F .2d 167
(2d Cir. 1965); impending liquidation of appreciated inventory, Speed v. Transamerica Corp.,
99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951) ; or discovery of a new mineral deposit, SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968). Early courts, however, took a narrow view of the
scope of the duty ; officers and directors were not required to make any disclosures to stockholders, so long as they were acting as individuals. III Loss, supra note 3, at 1446.
19. III Loss, supra note 3, at 1446. See Oliver v. Oliver, 118 Ga. 362, 45 S.E. 232 (1903)
(holding that officers and directors had to disclose all material facts to prospective purchasers
or sellers). See also Stewart v. Harris, 69 Kan. 498, 77 P . 277 (1904); Jacobson v. Yaschik,
249 S.C. 577, 584-85, 155 S.E.2d 601, 605 (1967).
Modern courts have followed the lead of these earlier cases and uniformly held that
insiders are fiduciaries with a duty not only to refrain from making fraudulent statements
but also to affirmatively disclose information . See cases cited in note 5 supra.
20. 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa . 1947) . For a discussion of this case see III Loss, supra
note 3, at 1457.
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of the outstanding stock held by the plaintiffs without disclosing the
proposed sale. The plaintiffs argued that had they known of the
proposed sale, they might not have sold their shares at the price
offered by the defendants. 21 The defendants argued that the plaintiffs were not entitled to a remedy absent proof of lost profits, an
element of the common law tort of deceit. 22 The court, however,
rejected that argument, basing its imposition of an affirmative duty
to disclose on the fiduciary obligations inherent in the defendants'
insider status. The court's rejection of the lost-profits requirement 23
demonstrates a judicial unwillingness to let a common-law heritage
rigidly define the boundaries of liability under rule lOb-5.
The question of whether controlling shareholders who were not
officers or directors had similar fiduciary duties of disclosure was
answered affirmatively 24 in Speed v. Transamerica Corp. 25 In
21. At the meeting at which the defendants purchased the plaintiffs' outstanding
shares, the plaintiffs' attorney specifically asked whether the defendants had entered into any
prior agreement for the sale of such stock. The defendants' attorney replied that no such
agreement existed. The plaintiffs contended that the defendants had also denied any preexisting agreement for the sale of the company's assets. Although there was substantial
dispute as to whether this fact had been disclosed, the court thought it made little difference
whether the plaintiffs had expressly asked about the sale of assets since the defendants had
failed to state a material fact needed to make their answer not misleading. Kardon, 73 F .
Supp . at 801 n.l.
22 . The defendants' position was that they could be held accountable as trustees only
for lost profits and that, absent proof of lost profits, they had no duty to account to the
plaintiffs for anything. Id. at 802.
23. In rejecting the necessity of proof on lost profits, the court said:
It is not necessary that they [prove lost profits]. The plaintiffs' case was established
when the defendants ' duty and its breach were proved, This was done by showing
that the defendants were officers and directors of Western and that they disposed of
the bulk of their corporate assets to an outsider for their own benefit, without disclosing the transaction to the plaintiffs . . ..
Id. at 802. The court explained that while one might have to prove lost profits in a commonlaw action, such proof was not required in a lOb-5 cause of action because it would defeat
the broad remedial provisions of the Exchange Act. Id. at 803.
24. See III Loss, supra note 3, at 1450.
25 . 99 F . Supp. at 808. In one of the few other cases involving a controlling shareholder in a nondisclosure suit, James Blackstone Mem. Lib. Ass'n v. Gulf, M & 0 R. Co.,
264 F.2d 445 (7th Cir. 1959) , the court held that there was no violation of rule lOb-5 on the
facts. In that case a minority shareholder alleged that the defendants had violated their
fiduciary duty by failing to disclose material facts affecting the value of the plaintiffs' stock.
The complaint alleged that when defendants purchased plaintiffs' shares, they failed to
disclose negotiations for a sale to the United States government of certain leasehold property
owned by the corporation. The plaintiffs claimed that access to that information would have
affected the price at which they were willing to tender their shares. The court rejected the
claim on the ground that at the time of the defendants' purchase of the plaintffs' shares, the
proposed sale to the government was only a "hope." The remoteness of the sale led the court
to conclude that the facts of this case were distinguishable from Kardon and Speed where
the nondisclosure concerned events or conditions which were already assured at the time of
the purchase. See id. at 450. There is, nonetheless, favorable dictum in the opinion to the
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Transamerica the majority stockholder of Axton-Fisher Company
made a written offer to all minority stockholders to purchase the
outstanding stock. Minority shareholders brought a class action 26
alleging that in accepting the defendant's offer to purchase their
shares they relied upon an annual report and letter which failed to
disclose certain material information, 27 and thus constituted a
breach of fiduciary duty. 28 The court concluded that the defendant's
failure to disclose the company's increased earnings and his intent
to liquidate violated rule lOb-5.
The court grounded liability for nondisclosure on the defendant's status as a majority stockholder, treating him as the equivalent of an insider29 -an approach emphasizing status in the liability
inquiry. 30 However, the court's reliance on the status/fiduciary duty
rationale was not exclusive. The court also stated that rule lOb-5
was intended to "provide some degree of equalization of bargaining
position" 31 among investors by equalizing access to information, a
view which provides a broader rationale for the imposition of an
effect that a majority stockholder of a corporation does occupy a fiduciary relation to minority
stockholders and is under an obligation to disclose material facts . Id.
26. In their suit plaintiffs alleged common-law actions of fraud and deceit as well as
violation of rule lOb-5. The complaint contained four counts. The first alleged a commonlaw action for fraud . The last three counts charged violations of various subparagraphs of rule
lOb-5 . Transam erica, 99 F . Supp. at 813. In counts two and three the plaintiffs alleged that
the defendants' soliciting of the minority's stock violated rule lOb-5 because at the time of
its mailing of the offer to purchase, the defendants had already formed the intent to liquidate
the company and the failure to disclose that intention violated clauses (a) and (c) of lOb-5 .
Id. at 813-14. For the text of these clauses of lOb-5 see note 3 supra. In the final count
plaintiffs charged that clause (b) of lOb-5 was violated by the failure to disclose improved
earnings or increased inventory value . Transam ~rica, 99 F. Supp. at 814.
27. The material information consisted of information regarding the increased value of
Axton Fisher, the real value of the inventory not reflected in the annual report, the improvement in earnings and the defendants' intention t o liquidate. Transamerica, 99 F. Supp. at
812.
28. The court rejected the defendant's argument that its only duty was the negative one
of refraining from affirmative misrepresentations. The court thought it a well-settled principle that "an implied misrepresentation is just as fraudulent as an express one." Id. at 829.
29. The court's treatment of the majority shareholder as equivalent to an insider is
reflected in the following explication of rule lOb-5:
The rule [rule lOb-5] is clear. It is unlawful for an insider, such as a majority
stockholder, to purchase of minority stockholders stock without disclosing material
facts affecting the value of the stock, known to the majority stockholder by virtue of
this inside position but not known to the selling minority stockholders which information would have affected the judgment of the sellers .
Id.
30. The court underlined the importance of status in its decision when it focused on
the status of those having a disclosure obligation. "One of the primary purposes of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.A. § 789 et. seq. , was to outlaw the use of inside
information by corporate officers and principal stockholders for their own financial advantage
to the detriment of uninformed public security holders." Id. at 828-29 .
31. Id. at 828.
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affirmative duty to disclose. Although the court regarded insider
status as an important element in assessing liability, its articulation
of the "equal bargaining" principle suggested that insider status
might not be an essential precondition to imposing liability. The
court's reading of the rule in terms of equalizing bargaining power
is significant because that principle is capable of supporting more
widespread liability in the future, based on the existence of unequal
bargaining power even in the absence of an insider relationship.
2.

TIPPEES OF INSIDERS HELD LIABLE IN CADY ROBERTS AND CO. AND
INVESTORS MANAGEMENT

Kardon and Transamerica interpreted rule lOb-5 as imposing
on traditional corporate insiders an affirmative obligation to disclose material information. In subsequent cases the Commission
and the courts broadened the rule's reach by expanding the category
of persons owing a like duty. Cady Roberts & Co. 32 marked the first
major expansion of that category. In Cady the Commission held
that persons who had received tips from corporate insiderstippees-could be held liable for trading on inside information.:i:i
32. 40 S.E .C. 907 (1961). One commentator viewed the Cady Roberts opinion as important for several reasons:
The Commission clearly established that nondisclosure was an "act, practice or
course of business" operating as a "fraud or deceit" within the meaning of clause 3
of rule lOb-5 . It held that the rule could reach nondisclosure by persons who are not
"insiders" at common law or by the terms of other sections of the Exchange Act, and
that a duty of disclosure was owed even in sales to unidentified persons on a public
exchange . The Commission also refused to consider a broker's fiduciary duty to the
discretionary accounts as a defense to a lOb-5 prosecution. Finally, it disclosed for
the first time an awareness of the importance of civil liability, observing that despite
the decline in importance of a "federal rule" in the light of Erie Co. v. Tompkins,
the securities acts may be said to have generated a wholly new and far-reaching body
of federal corporation law.
Comment, Insider Liability under Securities Exchange Act Rule JOb-5: The Cady Roberts
Doctrine, 30 U. CHI . L. REV. 121, 122 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Insider
Liability ]. S ee also VI Loss, supra note 3, at 3561 ; Daum & Philips, The Implications of Cady
Roberts, 17 Bus. LAW 939 (1962) .
Judicial recognition of the Cady principle of holding tippees liable under lOb-5 followed
the decision. In Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395 (S .D .N .Y. 1967), the sellers of stock brought
an action against a corporation and several of its stockholders and officers. Three of the
defendants had no position in the corporation . One defendant, however, was a brother of the
controlling directors and controlling shareholders . The other defendants were close personal
friends of the family controlling the corporation . The defendants purchased stock from the
plaintiffs at $120 per share without disclosing an intent to make a private offering of some of
it at $300 per share and a public offering of the remainder at $500 per share .
The court held that these three non-officer/director defendants were liable for nondisclosure under two possible theories. First, the court stated that the defendants were insiders.
But even if they were not insiders, the court was willing to hold them liable as tippees; as
such they were "subject to the same duty as insiders." Id. at 409-10 .
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The extention was a logical and necessary one; otherwise directors
and officers could easily evade the prohibitions against insider trading merely by furnishing the information to relatives and other third
parties. 34
In Cady, the Commission instituted a disciplinary proceeding
against a partner of a broker-dealer firm who, after receiving nonpublic information about a prospective cut in an issuer's dividend 35
from an associate in his firm, sold stock for discretionary accounts. 31
The associate obtained the information by virtue of his membership
on the issuer's Board of Directors. The Commission held that the
partner's sales, made before the information became public, violated the Exchange Act.
In Cady the Commission based its finding of liability for nondisclosure in part on the defendant's status. The Commission reasoned that because the defendant had special access to an insider
who would clearly have been obligated to disclose the information
had he traded on it himself, 37 the defendant, as the insider's tippee,
had equivalent responsibilities. 38 Because it framed the inquiry in
33. In an early case the SEC had reached a similar result in a disciplinary proceeding
against a broker-dealer who had submitted bids on the basis of inside information he had
derived from a corporate employee of the issuer. In In re Honohan, 13 S.E.C. 754 (1943), the
broker-dealer had an arrangement whereby he was able to get information on the sealed bids
that bondholders had made to sinking funds. That information was not available to other
broker-dealers. With that nonpublic information he was able successfully to underbid the
other bondholders. The Commission found him, as a tippee of a corporate employee, liable
for violating rule lOb-5. Id. at 758.
34. One author notes that "Whatever duty of disclosure Rule lOb-5 imposes upon officers, directors and controlling persons could be readily bypassed if the same duty were not
held to devolve at least upon members of their immediate families ." III Loss, supra note 3,
at 1450. See also Note, SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., supra note 6, at 212.
35. During 1959 Curtiss-Wright had paid a dividend of $.625 per share for each of the
first three quarters of the year. In the fourth quarter the company decided to pay a reduced
dividend at the rate of $.375 per share . For a discussion of the importance of dividend
information and its possible effect on the market cut, see Fleischer, An Initial Inquiry, supra
note 4, at 799 n .5.
36. Upon receiving the information Gintel, the partner, executed a solicited order and
sold shares for a discretionary account. He executed these orders at 11:15 a.m . and 11:18 a .m.
when the price of the stock was at 401A and 403/s. At 11:48 a.m . when the news of the
dividend cut was announced, there were so many sell orders that the Exchange was forced to
suspend trading in the issuer's stock.
37. The Commission stated that the obligation to disclose "rests on two principal elements: first, the existence of a relationship giving access, directly or indirectly, to information
intended to be available only for a corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of
anyone . . . ." Cady, 40 S.E .C at 912. For the second prong of the Commission's test, see
text accompanying note 42 infra.
38. "The facts here impose on [the defendant] the responsibilities of those commonly
referred to as insiders. " Cady, 40 S.E .C. at 912 . In its early interpretation of rule lOb-5,
however, the Commission had taken a restrictive view of the liability of tippees under the
rule. The Commission's narrow reading of the scope of the rule is reflected in the following
opinion:

172

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW

status terms, the Commission was primarily concerned with determining whether the defendant enjoyed a special relationship to an
insider, giving him access to information not otherwise available. 39
The Commission in Cady, however, recognized that status
should not be the exclusive determinant of liability. 40 Although
courts had previously imposed liability only when defendants fell
into certain predefined categories of persons, 41 the Commission now
stated that liability could also be based on "inherent unfairness
involved where a party takes advantage of such information
[intended only for a corporate purpose] knowing it is unavailable
to those with whom he is dealing." 42 The concern here was fair and
honest securities markets. The Commission's recognition that such
a goal was within the purpose of rule lOb-5 suggests that the rule
could be interpreted so as to hold a defendant liable for nondisclosure regardless of his status. However, the Cady decision itself did
not go so far, for it clearly tied the disclosure duty to the existence
of a relationship with an insider. 43
Another aspect of the Cady decision, however, gives added
credence to the view that market fairness falls within the ambit of
lOb-5 purposes. In Cady the Commission extended liability under
the rule to purchases as well as sales of securities. 44 The common law
imposed a duty of disclosure on insiders only for purchases 45 of issuer
[An) insider couid communicate to an outsider the same information he knows, and
the outsider might act on it, and unless the Commission had evidence from which
they could conclude that the insider was a party in fact to the transaction, either
acted in concern [sic] with or conspiracy with the outsider, I do not think that they
would hold the outsider as being in violation of rule x-lOb-5 . . . .
Hearings before Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 82d
Cong., 2d Sess. 726 (1952), cited in Note, Deterrence of Tippee Trading Under Rule JOb-5,
38 u. CHI. L. REV. 372, 380 (1971) .
39. "Thus our task here is to identify those persons who are in a special relationship
with a company and privy to its internal affairs, and thereby suffer correlative duties as
trading in its securities. Intimacy demands restraint lest the uninformed be exploited." Cady,
40 S.E.C. at 912.
40. The willingness to extend the disclosure obligations was based in part on the Commission's refusal to be circumscribed by fine distinctions and rigid classifications. Id.
41. The Commission acknowledged that three groups-officers, directors, and controlling shareholders-had previously been held liable, but now stated that these groups "do not
exhaust the category of persons upon whom there is such an obligation." Id.
42. Id.
43. See note 39 supra.
44. One commentator recognizes the difficulty of finding a duty to disclose when the
transaction involves a sale rather than a purchase of a security by corporate insiders. This is
because before the sale the buyer is not a shareholder of the issuer, and so the insider owes
him no duty to disclose material information. See Fleischer, Securities Trading, supra note
4, at 1279. Loss, in treating the subject of insiders' sales, states that " [T]he argument, of
course, is that an insider who sells to a person who is not already a security holder is not a
fiduciary whatever his status when he buys." Ill Loss, supra note 3, at 1454-55.
45. "Whatever distinction may have existed at common law based on the view that an
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stock; no such duty attached to sales because the fiduciary relationship between the insider and the buyer arose only after the sale was
completed. The Commission rejected this distinction between defrauded buyers and sellers on policy grounds. It found that the
approach was too narrow-that it "ignores the plight of the buying
public wholly unprotected from the misuse of special information, "'8 and that it was inappropriate in light of the purposes of the
Exchange Act. 47 The significance of the Commission's finding that
rule lOb-5 created a cause of action for defrauded purchasers lies in
its demonstration of the decreased role which common-law fiduciary
notions were playing in the determination of liability for nondisclosure. 48 Moreover, in rejecting all of the defendant's arguments
against an extension of the remedy to both purchasers and buyers,
the Commission was apparently motivated by a desire to protect the
public from the misuse of special information. The Commission
went out of its way to find liability, distinguishing the cases profferred by the defendant and rejecting the defendant's suggestion
that the mere absence of manipulation would immunize him if the
transaction were not a face-to-face one. The Commission refused to
be bound by what it regarded as "artificial walls of responsibility.""
The Commission in Cady felt compelled to tie tippee liability
back to insider status; in this regard its approach was a narrow and
officer or director may stand in a fiduciary relationship to existing stockholders from whom
he purchases but not to members of the public to whom he sells, it is clearly not appropriate
to introduce these concepts into the broader anti-fraud concepts embodied in the securities
acts." 40 S.E.C . at 913-14.
46. Id. at 913.
47. Id. at 914.
48. Two other theories, both less important from the standpoint of this comment, may
explain the court's willingness to extend liability. The first theory is that although insiders
do not stand in a fiduciary relationship to the defrauded buyer at the time of the transaction,
the sale itself imposes the same obligations which inhere in a fiduciary relation. As Judge
Learned Hand stated in an opinion affirming the constitutionality of§ 16(b) of the Exchange
Act, "When [directors or other corporate officers] sold shares, it could indeed be argued that
they were not dealing with a beneficiary, but with one whom his purchase made a beneficiary.
That should not, however, have obscured the fact that the director or officer assumed a
fiduciary relation to the buyer by the very sale . . . . " Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46, 49
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S . 920 (1951).
·
The other theory proposed to explain extension of the remedy to defrauded buyers is that
buyers expect the offer price to represent the insider's reasonable judgment as to a fair price.
See III Loss, supra note 3, at 1457. As one comentator explains, "The federal securities laws
like fraud doctrine generally, may be interpreted to impose a duty of disclosure if the expectation of the market place necessarily contemplates such a requirement." Fleischer, Securities
Trading, supra note 4, at 1279. See also PROSSER, supra note 4, § 108 at 714-18; Keeton,
Fraud-Concealment and Non-Disclosure, 15 TEx. L. REV. 1, 31-34 (1936). Moreover, the
Commission in Cady could see no logical reason for restricting recovery to defrauded sellers.
The Commission said that "[T]here is no valid reason why persons who purchase stock from
officers should not have the same protection afforded to them." 40 S.E.C. at 913.
49. Cady, 40 S.E.C. at 913.
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mechanical one. In Investors Management Co., 50 however, the Commission took a less mechanical approach to the problem of tippee
trading. In that case it indicated that it might impose liability for
nondisclosure simply on the basis of possession of material nonpublic information, 51 regardless of the defendant's status as an insider or an insider's tippee 52 and regardless of whether the information
emanated from an issuer source. 53
In Investors Management several defendants 54 received nonpublic information concerning a drop in per-share earnings and projected earnings55 from a broker-dealer whom they knew was the
prospective managing underwriter of a forthcoming public offering
of Douglas Aircraft debentures. After receiving that information,
the defendants sold Douglas stock 59 without revealing to the purchasers their nonpublic information. The Commission held that
such conduct constituted a violation of the antifraud provisions. 57
50. Sec. Exch. Act. Rel. No. 9267. Inv. Adv. Act. Rel. No. 289 (July 29, 1971) [19701971 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ii 78,163.
51. W. PAINTER, FEDERAL REGULATION Or INSIDER TRADING 143 n.9 (1978 Supp.) states,
"Some recent discussions of tippee liability have taken what might be termed a strict approach to the problem. Essentially this defines a tippee as anyone in possession of material
undisclosed information regardless of how he learned of such information."
52. The Commission focused on the fact of possession of undisclosed information because that possession put the recipient in a superior position. See text accompanying note 60
infra.
53. See text accompanying note 61 infra.
54. These defendants consisted of investment partnerships, institutional advisers, and
mutual funds . Investors Management, [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
ii 78,163 at 80,514.
55. The issuer had informed its prospective underwriter, Merrill Lynch, of the reduced
earnings and earnings forecasts on June 20, 1966. Specifically, Douglas indicated that it had
suffered a loss in May, that earnings for the first half of 1966 would amount to only 49 cents
per share and that its projections indicated it would break even for the year as a whole; the
outlook for 1967 was not much better, wit h earnings estimated at $5-6 per share. Id. ii 78,163
at 80,515.
Although it was proper for the issuer to disclose such information to its managing underwriter to enable the managing underwriter to make a sound business judgment about the
forthcoming offering, the managing underwriter was not entitled to disclose that information
to other firms for a noncorporate purpose. Id. ii 78,163 at 80,521.
56. Between June 21 and June 23 the respondents, who had been tipped by Merrill
Lynch, sold almost all of their Douglas stock and effected some short sales as well. The price
at which they sold ranged from 90 to 90 V2. On the day following the public announcement
of reduced earnings, the stock price fell to 76. Id. ii 78,163 at 80,516.
57. The examiner found that the respondents had violated 17(a) of the Securities Act
of 1933 as well as lO(b) of the Exchange Act and rule lOb-5. Id. ii 78,163 at 80,515.
In its opinion the court defined the elements required for such liability. First, the information must be material and nonpublic. The information was material since it "was of such
· importance that it could be expected to affect the judgment of investors whether to buy, sell
or hold Douglas stock . . . ."Id. ii 78,163 at 80,515 (citing Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., Sec. Exch. Act. Rel. No. 8459, at 5 (November 25, 1968)). The information was
nonpublic since it had not been generally disseminated to the public: "[I]nformation is
nonpublic when it has not been disseminated in a manner making it available to investors
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Investors Management expanded liability even further than
had Cady, by holding the defendants liable not on the basis of a
special access to an insider but on the basis of the mere receipt of
nonpublic information. 58 The court held that receipt of such information by one who has reason to know 59 that it emanates from a
corporate source when the information puts one in a position superior to that of other investors, triggers application of the antifraud
rules 80 and the duty to disclose. ·
Through this formulation the Commission evidenced a concern
with the use of nonpublic information which puts others at a disadvantage-and thus, with equal access. The Commission did not go
generally." Id. Investors Management, [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
78,163 at 80,519. (See also Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F .2d at 854: "Before insiders may act
upon material information such information must have been effectively disclosed in a manner
sufficient to insure its availability to the investing public .") . The commission recognized that
during 1966 there had been some rumors circulating indicating a pessimism about Douglas'
earnings. In addition, at a luncheon held on June 22 attended by about 50 professional
investors, there were rumors of disappointing earnings. The Commission found that neither
the general rumors nor those circulating at the luncheon constituted public dissemination.
First, the information conveyed to the respondents was of a more specific kind than could
previously have been known. The Commission implied that until the specific information
available to the respondent was disclosed to the public, there was no public dissemination.
The mere fact that rumors had been circulated was not an adequate substitute. The Commission also rejected the argument that the information was largely in the public domain by
virtue of the luncheon meeting. That kind of a meeting, consisting of a limited number of
investors, was not the kind of public disclosure required to put other investors in an equal
position in the marketplace. Id. Investors Management, [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 78,163 at 80,520.
The second element of liability is that the tippee must know or have reason to know that
the information was improperly obtained. Finally, the information must be a factor in the
decision to effect the transaction. The Commission found all three elements present.
58. This argument was qased on the analysis in Cady. There the court analyzed the
obligation to disclose in terms of the "existence of a relationship giving access, directly or
indirectly, to the information intended to be available only for a corporate purpose . . . . "
Cady, 40 S.E.C. at 912.
59. The Commission held that actual knowledge of the source of the information or its
nonpublic character was not required, rejecting the defendants' argument that in order to
establish a violation it must be shown that the defendant actually knew that there had been
a breach of fiduciary duty in the disclosure of the information. Investors Management, [19701971 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 78,163 at 80,520. The appropriate test, the
Commission held, "is whether the recipient knew or had reason to know that the information
was nonpublic and had been obtained improperly by selective revelation or otherwise." Id.
The Commission indicated that this test would impose a responsibility to disclose in
some situations but not in others. The Commission stated that "[o]ur formulation would
clearly attach responsibility in a situation where the recipient knew or had reason to know
the information was obtained by industrial espionage and commercial bribery or the like
. . . . Our test would not attach responsibility with respect to information which is obtained
by general observation or analysis." Id. ~ 78,163 at 80,519 n .18. The Commission's test is
useful in ensuring that financially sophisticated investors will not be penalized by a skillful
use of information that is generally available to all. See note 95 supra.
60. Investors Management, [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~
78,163 at 80,520.
~
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so far as to base liability on receipt alone (nor therefore, by implication, on equal access alone), but rather required an additional showing that th~ information emanated from a corporate source. 81 ·
The corporate source standard may be a meaningful variant of
the previously applied issuer source standard if the Commission is
implying that the corporate source could be a non-issuer source. If
one assumes that the Commission intended this broader meaning,
then even those having a more remote relationship to the issuer-tippees of tippees-could be liable for nondisclosure. However, as is more likely, even if the Commission used the term
"corporate" as meaning "issuer," the formulation still represents a
change in its increased concern with information which advantaged
one investor at the expense of another and thus with equal access.
3.

OUTSIDERS HELD LIABLE TO DISCLOSE IN CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES

In order to test how far courts are willing to extend liability, and
whether defendant's status as an insider or a tippee of an insider is
wholly determinative, it is important to examine the leading case
in which the Supreme Court held an outsider liable for nondisclosure. If an outsider has a duty to disclose, it may show that insider
status is not wholly determinative of liability and indicate that
there is an underlying principle to support liability without regard
to status.•2
Courts have been leery of extending liability to outsiders. 83 But
61.

We consider that one who obtains possession of material, nonpublic information which he has reason to know emanates from a corporate source, and which
by itself places him in a position superior to other investors, thereby acquires a
relationship with respect to that information within the purview and restraints of the
anti-fraud provisions.
Id. ~ 78,163 at 80,520. At one point in the decision, however, the Commission comes close to
adopting a rule based on possession alone. The Commission indicated that if the recipient
knows the information is nonpublic, that alone should be enough of a basis for imposing
liability: .
Consideration of both fairness and effective enforcement demand that the standard
as to requisite knowledge be satisfied by proof that one recipient had reason to know
of the nonpublic character of the information, and that it not be necessary to establish actual knowledge of that fact or, as suggested by the respondents, of a breach of
fact or, as suggested by the respondents, of a breach of fiduciary duty.
Id. ~ 78,163 at 80,520.
62. In spite of a general unwillingness to extend liability to outsiders, courts have been
more willing to hold an outsider liable for nondisclosure in an SEC enforcement proceeding
than in an action brought by an issuer. Two factors may explain that difference. First, a court
may be unwilling to intervene in an issuer-initiated suit because it may fear that the issuer
is merely trying to use the alleged nondisclosure to escape a bad bargain. Second, a court
may feel that the issuer does not need the outsider to disclose because it is likely to have
access to the information allegedly wrongfully withheld.
63. In Frigitemp v. Financial Dynamics Fund [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) ~ 95,323 (2d Cir. 1975), the court rejected the lOb-5 claim brought by an
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in Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States" which involved neither
insiders nor tippees, the court found liability. In Affiliated Ute the
disputed trading was peculiar because it was affected by the existence of a federal statute, the Ute Partition Act, which attempted to
divide tribe assets between full and mixed blood members. Under
the Act the mixed bloods organized the Ute Distribution Corp.
(UDC) to distribute assets to half-bloods. The mixed bloods were
restricted in their ability to dispose of the stock since they had to
give the right of first-refusal to full-blood members. To facilitate
distribution of the assets and provide for central control over the
stock, the mixed bloods designated a bank as the UDC stock transfer agent in which capacity it held the stock certificates and issued
receipts. In administering the scheme two bank employees started
buying shares from mixed bloods in order to resell the stock to
whites at higher prices in contravention of the bank's duty to prevent such sales. The mixed bloods brought a suit against the employers for lOb-5 violations.
Affiliated Ute is significant because it evinces the Supreme
Court's willingness to impose liability on non-insiders for a failure
to disclose market information, thus demonstrating that the judgment of the Second Circuit in Chiarella did not represent a radical
departure from prior interpretations of lOb-5. Affiliated Ute also
illustrates the continuing inarticulation of the underlying principle
which impelled the Court to find liability: the need to achieve equal
access to information. Instead the Court emphasized the particularity of the factual circumstances in the "market maker" relationship
defendants had to plaintiffs which gave rise to a duty to disclose.
However, the emphasis on market maker status obscures the reason
why the court attached importance to that fact: the inequality in
access to information which the relationship created. In articulating
the basis on which liability had been continually expanded to new
categories of persons in new factual situations, the Second Circuit
in Chiarella did what no court had been willing to do before.
outsider/purchaser against an issuer for nondisclosure of information on the grounds that
outsiders-unlike insiders or controlling shareholders-owed no duty to disclose. Id. ~ 95,323
at 98,633-34.
Another case in which the court exempted an outsider from disclosure obligations is
General Time v. Talley Industries, 403 F.2d 159 (2d Cir. 1968). In that case a target company
brought a suit against a tender offeror for its failure to disclose its intent to merge or acquire
the issuer. The court rejected the claim, saying that it knew of no law or principle requiring
a non-insider/purchaser to disclose such information. Id. at 1164.
64. 406 U.S. 128 (1972) .
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LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL ACCESS

Since the cases do not expressly support the principle of equal
access, it may be useful to examine the congressional purposes underlying the Exchange Act to determine how far the scope of civil
liability extends under the Act and whether its policies support
liability for nondisclosure when the equal access principle is violated. This section of the comment will demonstrate that the legislative history suggests an underlying concern with equalizing access
to information but fails to provide very specific guidelines for determining what circumstances would constitute actionable violations
of that principle.
Congress passed both the Securities Act of 193365 and the Exchange Act88 in response to abuses in stock exchange transactions
which it felt had precipitated the 1929 crash and contributed to the
ensuing depression.87 From 1932 to 1934 the Senate Committee on
Banking and Currency inquired 88 into stock exchange practices. In
1934 the subcommittee issued a final report documenting various
abuses, 89 including the excessive use of credit, 70 inadequate disclosure71 by issuers of listed securities, and short swing profits made by
officers and directors in their own companies' securities. 72 The Exchange Act adopted a variety of legislative provisions to address
these abuses. 73
Although none of the particular provisions of the Act provides
explicit support for the principle of equal access, several sections
implicitly support that notion. Section 16, for example, addresses
65. 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (1976)). See Landis,
The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV . 29 (1959) .
66. For sources discussing the background of the Act, see note 1 supra.
67. See PAINTER, supra note 51, at 2; Landis, supra note 65, at 30; Loomis, supra note
1, at 216-17.
68. See PAINTER, supra note 51 , at 1.
69. See Loomis, supra note 1, at 217 .
70. The Exchange Act instituted a system of credit controls to prevent recurrence of
abuses. See 48 Stat. 886 (1934) (currently codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78(g) (1976)); 48 Stat. 881
(1934) (currently codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78(a) , (b) (1976)); 49 Stat. 704 (1935) (currently
codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78(h) (1976)) . Under §§ 7 and 8 of the Exchange Act, the Federal
Reserve Board was authorized to set margin requirements in the trading of securities to
prevent excessive speculation . See Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, Stock Exchange
Practices, S. Rep. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
71. See text accompanying notes 77-80 infra.
72. See text accompanying notes 74-76 infra.
73. See Loomis, supra note 1, at 218. To deter such trading the Act provides for a "three
fold scheme of deterrence," with section 16(a) of the Act requiring reporting by certain officers
of changes in beneficial ownership, section 16(b) providing for a disgorgement of profits
earned from the purchase (or sale) of a security within six months of its sale or purchase, and
section 16(c) proscribing any short sales by certain insiders and 10% stockholders. See
Loomis, supra note 1, at 228-29.
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the problem of insider trading. Under section 16(a) officers, directors, and beneficial owners of more than ten percent of any class of
stock are required to report changes in their holdings. 74 Section
16(b) provides that profits derived from insider trading inure to the
benefit of the corporation rather than to the individual trader. 75
Each of these subsections of section 16 can be explained in part
as an effort to equalize the relative position of the corporate insider
vis-a-vis the average investor by equalizing their access to material
information. For example, by requiring officers, directors, and ten
percent beneficial owners to report changes means that those persons most likely to have access to inside information cannot dispose
of their stock without publicly disclosing that they have done so. If
an officer is privy to information which warrants a sale or purchase
of issµer stock, others will thus be advised of the existence of such
facts through reports of the sale. Although this requirement alerts
stockholders to the possible existence of facts affecting the value of
the stock only after the insider's transaction has occurred, and
therefore still leaves them at a disadvantage, the other sections of
section 16 serve further to equalize their relative positions. Section
16(b)'s disgorgement requirement-which deprives insiders of the
benefit of their special access to nonpublic information about the
issuer by prohibiting personal profit thereby-may effectively reduce instances of trading in which a substantial disparity of information exists. The prohibition against retaining the profits from
short swing sales can foster more equal access to information. By
requiring persons having special access to information to retain securities purchased from their own company for a minimum of six
months, the law provides a lag time during which the nonpublic
information which prompted the insider to buy may become public.
The provision thereby reduces the likelihood that informational disparities will exist at the time the insider sells his stock, and insures
more equal access to key information. 78
In addition to the above provisions, the Exchange Act requires
issuers of listed securities to file periodic reports with the Commission and the Exchange on which the stock is listed. 77 These reporting
74. 15 U.S.C . § 78p(a) (1976).
75. Id. § 78p(b) (1976) .
76. Of course, after the information becomes public, the price may have drastically
increased. The insider who bought cheap before the information was available can still profit
after six months have elapsed by cashing in after disclosure. However, this provision can still
reduce unfairness resulting from informational disparities at the time the investor sells his
shares.
77. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1976). Exchanges are institutions where securities are bought
and sold based on bids and offers from the entire country. There are commonly two operative
restrictions: Only members of the exchange can effect floor trades, and only securities listed
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requirements may also be explained in terms of the principle of
equal access to information. The requirements ensure that the average investor will have greater access to information about the issuer
than was available before the passage of the Act. 78 That access reduces the disparity in information between the insider and the average investor. Moreover, Congress indicated that a desire to equalize
access to information among investors underlay these reporting requirements. The House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce stated: "The reporting provisions of the proposed legislation
are a very modest beginning to afford that long-denied aid to the
exchanges in the way of securing proper information for the investor. " 71 The House report continued: "The possession of these facts
has for a number of years been the exclusive prerequisite of powerful
banking and industrial groups. Making these facts generally available will be of material benefit and guidance to business as a
whole." 80
One other provision of the Exchange Act may reflect an underlying concern with equal access to information-the requirement
that national exchanges register with the Commission.81 That provision was designed to convert the exchanges from private clubs to
public institutions. 82 It is at least arguable that one of the risks to
the public from an exchange functioning as a club would be its
tendency to benefit members at the expense of the investing public.
Members of such clubs may have had access to information not
generally available. Registering the exchanges provides for oversight
of their practices. Under such close scrutiny it is doubtful that an
exchange could continue to operate for the benefit of a small and
sophisticated elite group of investors.
These specific provisions of the Exchange Act are useful in
underscoring a broad congressional concern to make more informaon the exchange may be traded. See Loomis, supra note 1, at 215.
78. Of course, the required filing of periodic reports does not guarantee an equality of
access to information among all investors. It might be argued that if Congress in fact sought
parity of informat ion in enacting the registration requirements, it would have gone further
and required full disclosure in such reports of all inside information, and not confined the
disclosure obligations to limited types of information. However, it would be at least as compelling to say that in limiting disclosure requirements, Congress was not undermining a
commitment to equal access; rather, it felt that total disclosure was not required to ensure
that investors had opportunities comparable to those of insiders to profit in the market.
79. H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1934) .
80. Id.
81. See 15 U.S.C. § 78f (1976).
82. "The bill proceeds on the theory that the exchanges are public institutions which
the public is invited to use for the purchase and sale of securities listed thereon, and are not
private clubs to be conducted only in accordance with the interests of its members." H.R.
REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1934), cited in Landis, supra note l , at 221.
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tion available to a large group of investors. Thus the legislative
history, like the case law, suggests support-albeit inexpress-for a
principle of equal access. Neither, however, provides clear reasons
in policy for imposing liability based on that principle. The comment therefore turns to the problem of justifying the equal access
principle in light of the goals of the Exchange Act and the case law.
One could justify the equal access rule on moral grounds-that
it is somehow "wrong" for some investors to have special access to
information. 83 That explanation, however, does not seem to satisfactorily explain the case law or legislative history. If moral outrage was
a sufficient explanation for the courts' expressed and implied concerns with equal access, they would have imposed liability whenever
the defendant's conduct offended their moral sensibilities and
would have dispensed with the elaborate justifications for liability
based on status and duty. Although the importance of a moral concern cannot be discounted in light of the repeated references to
achieving fairness, 84 it seems that Congress was concerned more
with the public's perception of fairness than with fairness in an
absolute sense, since it was the perceived fairness or unfairness that
would impact most on investor confidence.
Moreover, even if equal access can be theoretically justified on
moral grounds, morality is not especially helpful in effectuating the
goal of equal access. Since morality-based prohibitions are likely to
be felt as arbitrary due to the inherently subjective value judgments
involved, such prohibitions will be resisted. 85 Thus, to effectuate the
equal access goal, other policy justifications should be explored.

III.

POLICY REASONS FOR ADOPTION OF EQUAL ACCESS: THE EQUALITY
OF OPPORTUNITY

Several policies could be advanced in support of the principle
of equal aecess to information. This section will demonstrate that
the policy of equal opportunity among the investing public best
explains the development of the case law and the drafting of the
Exchange Act. The identification of equal opportunity among investors as the principal motivating factor behind equal access is also
important because it provides a principled basis for limiting the
scope of liability for nondisclosure.
Equal access could also be justified as a means of assuring an
equality of profits among investors. Under this view the law would
83. See Schotland, Unsafe at Any Price: A Reply to Manne; Insider Trading and the
Stock Market, 53 VA. L. REV. 1425, 1430 (1967) .
84. Id. at 1438. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78(d), l(b)(2), l(b)(3), m(a), s(b) (1976).
85. See Schotland, supra note 83, at 1426.
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guarantee equal access to information because without it some
investors will profit at the expense of others. Thus, if A has access
to nonpublic information about an impending tender offer and B, a
shareholder of the potential target company, does not, A should be
required to abstain from purchasing B's shares in the target company. Otherwise, B will tender his shares at a lower price than he
would if he were aware of A's undisclosed intention to make a tender
offer.
Several reasons militate against recognizing a policy in favor of
a certain distribution of profits among traders. First, that policy
interferes with the free play of market forces by setting arbitrary
limits on profits. 88 Moreover, making the determination of disclosure obligations turn on who receives what amount of the profits
appears to have little support in the case law or the Exchange Act.
The fairness of the transaction, rather than ultimate distribution of
profits, appears to provide the occasion for imposing liability.
Third, a policy based on a relative equality of outcome is troubling
because it could proscribe trading by financially sophisticated
investors who, even though they have no information about the
issuer that is not generally available to others, are likely to achieve
greater profits than the average investor. There seems to be no
logical justification for penalizing investors who simply happen to
be more skilled in using generally available information.87
The policy most strongly favoring equal access-and the one
that probably motivated Congress in its enactment of section
!Ob-was the goal of assuring equality of opportunity among all
investors. An equal chance to realize market profits appears to be
essential for achieving the primary congressional goals of renewed
investor confidence88 and vigor'eus capital markets.
If a well-informed investor merely fails to achieve a certain level
of profits, his overall confidence in the market is not likely to be
impaired. He may decide to alter his investments or to seek better
investment advice, but will probably continue to participate in the
market. However, if an investor feels that others, either because of
their position as insiders or because of a strategic position in the
86. Chiarella, 588 F.2d at 1367.
87. In fact, there is no restriction on the use of public information by financially sophisticated investors. See note 95 infra.
88. H. R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Seas. (1934): "If investor confidence is to come
back to the benefit of exchanges and corporations alike, the law must advance." Id. at 5. In
its discussion of the need to control unfair practices by corporate insiders, the report emphasized congressional concern with restoring investor confidence. A renewal of investors' confidence in the exchange markets can be effected only by a clearer recognition upon the part of
the corporate managers of companies whose securities are publicly held of their responsibilities as trustees for their corporations. Id. at 13.
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market, regularly enjoy access to information that is not available
to him or to other ordinary investors, he may develop a sense of
unfairness in the functioning of the markets and may decline to
participate. Although he may be unhappy when, in the ordinary
course of things, he suffers a loss in his investments, if he senses that
insiders profit because of special access to knowledge that he is
denied, he may be unwilling to accept the loss with equanimity. 90 If
he senses that his failure to match their profits cannot be explained
by chance or his lack of investment sophistication, his sense of
unfairness may sharpen to the point where he withdraws entirely.
The courts and the Commission have recognized this problem
by interpreting section lOb as a limitation on insider exploitation of
special knowledge. Although there have been far fewer cases involving nondisclosure when the person trading is an outsider, the same
limitations should be applied in such contexts. If an outsider happens to enjoy access to nonpublic information of a kind that is likely
to affect the market value of an issuer's securities, the investor
without access to that information is likely to experience a similar
sense of unfairness when he buys stock from or sells it to such a
person as when he sells to an insider. 91
Equal access to material information thus seems necessary to
achieve the primary congressional goals of investor confidence and
fairness. The principle has another advantage as well: it would encourage a case-by-case analysis of liability of potential defendants'
nondisclosure of nonpublic information. The "status" inquiry of the
of the early case law-tying the duty of disclosure to the defendant's
status as an insider or a tippee of an insider-precludes analysis of
whether outsiders should be subject to the disclosure duty, and is
thus of limited usefulness. Although it may lead to acceptable results when the potential defendant falls into a certain class of persons, in other cases where the potential defendant is not a tradi89. Congress wanted to preserve and strengthen the capital markets by preventing a
recurrence of the abuses which had led to the pre-1929 situation. "This bill seeks to save, not
destroy, stock markets and business, by making necessary changes in time." Id. at 3.
90. Schotland, supra note 83, at 1451. Although when considered in isolation an investor's decision not to participate may not seem significant, if other investors share this sense
of unfairness and they also decline to participate, investor confidence as well as the strength
of the capital markets may be impaired. Thus, the principle of equal access raises a concern
broader than whether one investor rather than another profits.
91. For example, suppose an employee of the Pentagon knows that the government is
going to award a contract on the following day to one of several competing companies. See
JENNINGS & MARSH, supra note 4, at 952. With the benefit of the information, the employee
purchases stock from a shareholder of the winning bidder. Although the would-be defendant
is an outsider, if such a transaction occurs frequently, the investor's sense of unfairness likely
will equal that experienced when he has knowledge that insiders are exploiting their position
in the company to his disadvantage.
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tional insider the status approach may lead to undesirable results.
Application of the equal access principle would permit courts to
impose liability on outsider defendants in a wider variety of circumstances than the traditional approach allows. Since outsiders may
occupy a strategic position through which they acquire material
nonpublic information, a principle which allows a court to hold such
a person liable seems desirable.
IV.

APPLICATION OF THE EQUAL ACCESS PRINCIPLE: CHIARELLA'S
"REGULAR RECEIPT" TEST AND A PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE

As discussed in the preceding sections, the courts and the Commission have grappled with defining the scope of liability for lOb-5.
The most difficult problems have arisen in connection with the issue
of outsiders' liability. The Second Circuit in United States v.
Chiarella 12 has recently adopted the principle of equal access to
information and a test based on the regular receipt of market information as means of defining the scope of liability for outsider trading. Under the Second Circuit's view, there should ideally be equality of access to all material information. Absent such access, an
outsider in receipt of market information becomes a "market insider" and shares the corporate insider's or tippee's duty to disclose
or refrain from trading.
A.

What Test for Equal Access?
1.

THE CHIARELLA APPROACH

Equal access as the governing principle of the case law and of
congressional legislation is not novel; as has been shown in sections
I and II of this comment, the Second Circuit has only recognized
what was embodied inexpressly in the continued expansion of liability under the case law and in the legislative history and policies of
the Exchange Act.
Although equal access is the most explanatory and appropriate
principle, its application may be problematic because it is a vague
and general concept. Strict adherence to the principle could result
in proscription of otherwise desirable trading. However, one can
endorse the principle without requiring literal adherence to it. Although Congress evinced a concern with equalizing the bargaining
position of the parties through equalizing access to information,
that policy cannot be considered in a vacuum; it must be viewed in
conjunction with the congressional goal of allowing tender offers to
92.

588 F.2d 1358 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. granted, 99 S.Ct. 2158 (1979) .
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proceed so long as there is compliance with certain disclosure requirements. Therefore, it is appropriate to seek a test implementing
the equal access principle which simultaneously limits its application in light of Congress' desire to foster certain economic activity.
To meet the difficulties inherent in applying a vague principle
and thus provide guidelines for the application of equal access, the
Second Circuit devised a test proscribing trading by those who regularly receive market information13 and who thus make up a class of
"market insiders.""
The information which Chiarella failed to disclose can be characterized as "market information" because it consisted of information affecting the price of the securities based on knowledge of
impending stock market events rather than information concerning
the issuer's assets or earning power. 95 Although the test appropriately expands the category of persons having a duty to disclose and
the type of information required to be disclosed, in a sense it is

.

93. Id. at 1365.
94. Id. at 1358.
95. Chiarella, 588 F.2d at 1365 n.8; Fleischer, An Initial Inquiry, supra note 4, at 798.
Jennings, Insider Trading, supra note 4, at 810; Ruder, Corporate Disclosures Required by
the Federal Securities Laws: Codification Implications of Texas Gulf Sulphur, 61 Nw. U.L.
REV. 872 (1967) .
Generally, market information is classifiable according to either the nature or the source
of the information. If defined according to the latter, it means information from a nonissuer
source. Chiarella's information would meet this definition since he acquired his knowledge
from the acquiring company and not from the target-issuer. If defined according to the nature
of the information, market information concerns events affecting the market value of the
company's securities rather than their intrinsic worth. Under this definition, market information could emanate from an issuer source. However, information affecting the market for a
company's securities is more likely to have an outside source. See Koeltl & Longstreth, supra
note 4, at 844. See also Oppenheimer & Co. [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) ~ 80,551 at 86,415 n.2; JENNINGS & MARSH, supra note 4, at 952-53; Fleischer, An Initial
Inquiry, supra note 4, at 798.
The distinction between market information and inside information is important because
a person with market information is likely to be an outsider and a person with access to inside
corporate information is likely to be an insider. Insider/outsider status may be important in
determining the obligation to disclose, because courts have required insiders and their tippees
to disclose to the company stockholders on a fiduciary theory. See notes 20-61 supra and
accompanying text. In certain situations, however, outsiders have also been charged with a
duty to disclose. See notes 62-64 supra and accompanying text. The source of the outsider's
duty cannot rest on a fiduciary theory since he has no fiduciary obligation to the stockholders
of the issuer.
It should be noted that financial sophistication formed from generally available information is neither inside nor market information. It is presumed that some investors will be able
to use such information in a way that enables them to profit more than other investors. There
is no restriction on the financially sophisticated investor when he relies on information to
which all other investors have access. See Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 848; ill Loss, supra
note 3, at 1463; Jennings, Insider Trading, supra note 4, at 810; Schotland, supra note 83, at
1430; Note, Investors Management: Institutional Investors as Tippees, 119 U. PA. L. REv. 502,
508 (1971) .
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simply an extension of the older approach: it still focuses on the
category of information and status of the defendant. In traditional
applications of these concepts courts have proven willing to find
defendants falling outside the categories 88 liable in order to effectuate a perceived underlying policy. However, the saine concepts
can be used to limit liability. If a defendant could persuade a court
that he fell outside a predefined category, he might escape liability
even if his trading violated equal access and exacerbated the ordinary investor's sense of market unfairness. Instead of continuing to
expand the concepts to meet new factual circumstances therefore,
this comment suggests that the better approach would be to abandon altogether the concepts of status/type of information as determinants of liability. The comment in this section proposes an alternative test for imposing liability under the equal access principle
which Chiarella recognized. The proposed test would both give specificity to the vague equal access principle, and make a final break
with the status inquiry perpetuated in the Second Circuit's "regular
receipts" test. It would thus avoid the unwarranted limitations of
that approach.
2.

AN ALTERNATIVE TEST BASED ON MOTIVE

The proposed test is one of motive. Under this test anyone
trading on material undisclosed information, no matter who and no
matter what the source of the information, would be presumptively
liable under rule lOb-5. The presumption could be rebutted by the
trader's showing a legitimate business reason for his trading on nonpublic information: i.e., non-personal profit motive. 97

a

96. The expansion of liability in the category of persons is illustrated in the tracing of
liability from the traditional corporate insider to controlling shareholders and tippees. See
text accompanying notes 24-49 supra.
Examples of the category of information required to be disclosed include In re Honohan,
discussed in note 33 supra, In re Blyth & Co., [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) ~ 77,647 (1969) (Treasury Department employee liable for wrongfully disclosing market information about interest rates of a forthcoming Treasury offering) .
97. One could attack this test as unworkable on the ground that all trading involves
personal profit. Even in trading for legitimate corporate objects, the corporation is seeking
to increase its own profits. However, it makes sense in policy terms to distinguish these types
of trading because of their differing potential impact on investor confidence. The added
presence of a corporate purpose is likely to increase the perceived legitimacy of the trade, a'ld
is thus less likely to impair confidence in market fairness.
The proposal of a business purpose test conflicts with the Second Circuit's holding that
the presence or absence of a business purpose was irrelevant in assessing Chiarella's liability.
To support its view of the unimportance of business purpose in a lOb-5 inquiry the court cites
Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1976). Yet as the Second Circuit itself
concedes, the facts of Santa Fe were different since the issue was whether the absence of a
business purpose would trigger lOb-5 liability even when the required disclosures were made.
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As a means of defining the scope of liability, a motive test has
important advantages over the older fiduciary notions and over application of the equal access principle through the Chiarella court's
"regular receipt" test. It would encourage a case-by-case evaluation
not possible under the older case law or even under Chiarella. Under
traditional case law, liability was seemingly foreclosed in certain
cases for defendants who were not traditional corporate insiders or
their tippees, 18 without regard to the merits of a particular case.
Even under Chiarella, trading by outsiders would not always be
proscribed: if an outsider used nonpublic information to his advantage but did not regularly receive such information, he would apparently not be liable in a lOb-5 cause of action.
The proposed test's restriction of liability to cases involving a
personal profit motive seems to make sense in terms of the Exchange Act's goals of restoring investor confidence and sustaining
vigorous capital markets. 19 Restricting liability to cases involving
trading for personal gain is consistent with the view that an investor
is less likely to feel as acute a sense of unfairness where no other
identifiable individual is profiting directly at his expense. Second,
he may think that information accruing to such investors engaged
in business activity is likely to strengthen the market overall and
thus ultimately redound to his benefit.
The legitimate business activity that would permit a rebuttal
of presumptive liability under the test is less likely to involve nonpublic information about the issuer's financial worth than is trading
for personal profit. 100 Legitimate activity is more likely to be based
on information that the defendant himself has generated, as in the
case of a defendant's intent to make a tender offer. Trading on the
basis of such information should not tend to impair investor confidence; in such cases the average investor is not likely to feel totally
foreclosed since he has the same opportunity as the offeror to decide
that the stock is undervalued and purchase it. 101
Chiarella, 588 F.2d at 1368 n .15. Thus, Santa Fe does not resolve the question of whether the
presence of a legitimate business purpose can protect conduct that would otherwise be prohib'
ited by lOb-5.
98. See cases cited in note 63 supra where courts refused to hold outsiders liable for
nondisclosure.
99. See notes 88-89 supra.
100. Although it might appear that in drawing attention to the type of information the
comment is reelevating the importance of a discredited basis for imposing liability, in fact it
is not doing so. It is merely suggesting that because legitimate business activity is not likely
to involve the witholding of information whose nondisclosure will impair investor confidence,
it should not be subjected to a presumption of liability.
101. The Second Circuit found the fact that the offeror does not receive but creates
information to be a significant reason for exempting it from liability for nondisclosure.
Chiarella, 588 F.2d at 1366. If one accepts the distinction between creating and receiving
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The motive test focuses on the appropriate issue. Instead of
looking to the status of the defendant or to the kind or source of
information, it inquires instead whether there has been trading on
nonpublic information which is sufficiently like cheating102 to impair
investor confidence. The test provides a means of screening out
those instances where there should be no liability even though there
is technically a violation of the equal access principles, by providing
a defense for those having a legitimate business reason for their
conduct. It thus encourages desirable economic activity .103

B.

Some Examples: The Motive Test Applied to Outsider Trading

To guage the usefulness of the motive test as a means of identifying how far the scope of liability for nondisclosure should extend
under lOb-5, several examples involving trading by outsiders with
access to nonpublic information will be explored. In the Chiarella
situation, for example, the mere fact that the information was market information rather than information about the financial worth
of the company would not immunize Chiarella from liability. 104 Neiinformation as an important one in defining liability, it could be argued that institutional
investors, discussed in text accompanying notes 113-16 infra, to whom the offeror leaks
information to induce the lender to finance the takeovet , would be liable as receivers of
information . However, the institutional investor should escape liability for nondisclosure
because even in such cases the investor can decide on his own to buy the undervalued stock.
102. The term "cheating" is not used as one of moral opprobrium but is used to refer
to trading that would strike the ordinary investor as unfair and reduce the likelihood of his
participation.
103. A recent student note proposed an alternative test which would also help to preserve incentives for such a~tivity. See Comment, The Application of Rule lOb-5 to Market
Insiders, 92 HARV . L. REv. 1538, 1547 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Market
Insiders]. Under the proposed test, those who regularly receive nonpublic information would
be forbidden from using it except in connection with their market function. Because this test
is narrower, it may help to provide additional incentives for economic activity; however, the
inquiry still focuses on the status of the defendant through his position in the market and
thus fails to address the importance of the underlying policy of equalizing access to information .
104. Chiarella, 588 F.2d at 1358. For a discussion of the concept of market information
see text accompanying notes 93-96 supra. The SEC has signalled its view that the misuse of
market information may amount to a violation of lOb-5. See In re Honohan, 13 S.E.C . 754
(1943) (broker-dealer who misappropriated nonpublic market information guilty of violating
lOb-5) .
The Commission has also applied lOb-5 to market information frauds in two other contexts. Recent consent decrees have been obtained in several instances where confidential
market information concerning potential tender offers has been misappropriated. See SEC
v. Primar Typographers, Inc., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP (CCH) ii 95,734
(S .D.N.Y.); SEC v. Ayoub, [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ii 95,567
(S .D.N.Y. 1976) ; SEC v. Sorg Printing Co., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC . L. REP.
(CCH) ii 94,767 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) . Executives of acquired companies with nonpublic market
information of an impending tender offer have also been the subject of SEC enforcement
actions under lOb-5. See SEC v. Stone, SEC Litigation Release No. 8527 (S .D.N.Y. 1978);
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ther would his status as an outsider. 105 Because he traded on material nonpublic information, he would be liable unless he could show
there was a legitimate business reason for his conduct. Since he
converted information to his personal use, 106 he could not rebut the
presumption of liability and would be liable for nondisclosure for
exploiting uninformed investors.
Another trader who would be subject to the disclose-or-abstain
rule because he could offer no financial justification for his conduct
would be a financial journalist who trades on the basis of information he knows will be printed on the following day. This was the
situation in Zweig u. Hearst Corp., 107 where a journalist wrote a
column that contained a highly favorable description of a company
known as ASI on the basis of material misrepresentations which the
company supplied. Before publishing the article he bought 5,000
shares at a discount below market price; after publication, the owners of a second company merged into ASI in return for stock that
was temporarily inflated due to the misrepresentations in the article.108 The owners who had merged brought a lOb-5 suit alleging
damages suffered as a result of their reliance on the columnist's
misrepresentations. The court found the columnist liable for damSEC v. Healy, SEC Litigation Release No. 6589 (S .D.N.Y. 1974); SEC v. Rosenberg, [19741975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 74,766 (S .D.N.Y. 1974).
The Second Circuit's adoption of the view reflected in the foregoing SEC enforcement
proceedings-that the misuse of market information can furnish the basis for a fraud action-seems to make sense in policy terms . It should make no difference that the information
a trader acquires by virtue of his strategic position differs from that acquired by the corporate
insider. To protect the justifiable expectations of investors, disclosure would be required in
each case. Yet until Chiarella, it was unclear whether an outsider who trades on advance
knowledge of stock market events, but who has no information about the company's financial
worth not publicly available, would be liable for nondisclosure. See cases cited in note 63
supra (exempting outsiders from liability for nondisclosure). But see text accompanying note
64 supra.
105. For a case where an outsider was held liable for nondisclosure, see text accompanying note 64 supra. The Chiarella court thought that the defendant's status was really irrelevant in a determination of liability under lOb-5. In responding to the status argument-that
because Chiarella was not an insider he owed no fiduciary duty-the court said, "That
appellant was not an insider . . . is true but irrelevant." Chiarella, 588 F.2d at 1364. The
court based its rejection of the status rationale on its perception of the purposes of the antifraud provisions. The court took a broad view of those purposes when it held that those
provisions were designed to insure "that all investors trading on impersonal exchanges have
relatively equal access to material information ." Id. at 1365.
106. Id. at 1367. The Second Circuit found that such conversion resulted in Chiarella's
violation of his duties as an agent under § 395 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency.
Moreover, the court concluded that this violation itself constituted a violation of lOb-5 since
it was connected with and used to sell securities. Id. at 1368 n .14. This comment suggests
that the trader's business purpose~rather than the presence or absence of an agent's duty
to his principal-should form the basis for a liability inquiry. See note 97 supra.
107. [Current) FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 96,851 (9th Cir. 1979) .
108. Id. ~ 96,851 at 95,457-58.
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ages on the ground that he had a duty to his readers either to refrain
from trading, or to disclose the fact that he had purchased stock at
a bargain on the expectation that he would write his column and
sell on the rise. 109
Although the Zweig court reached the correct result because
to have allowed the trading would have impaired the confidence of
future investors in the integrity of the market, it makes more sense
to ground the duty on a straightforward application of the equal
access principle through a motive test. Such an approach would
obviate the need to unduly stretch the broad holding in Affiliated
Ute-which is exemplified by the Zweig opinion-or to pin too
much on specialized concepts such as a journalist's duty to his
readers. Since the journalist traded solely for his own gain, he would
not be able to rebut the presumption that the trading was proscribed.
To assess the sweep of the motive test, it is necessary to look
not only at cases where it would result in a finding of liability, but
also where it would protect trading on nonpublic information. The
test would protect such trading where the trader could offer legitimate business reasons for his activities.
For example, under the proposed test a tender offeror who has
an undisclosed intention to make a tender offer would not be subjected to liability for trading on that nonpublic information. Although the unannounced intention is material, and permitting the
tender offeror to trade without disclosing gives him an advantage,
the tender offeror would nonetheless be able to show that his primary goal in trading would not be to garner personal profits but to
serve a more general corporate purpose of acquiring a target company which would be a useful addition to his own company. He
would therefore be able to rebut the presumption of liability.
The tender offeror's exemption from liability for preannouncement trading under this test would have conflicted with the SEC's
109. The court found the violation of the readers' expectations that the journalist would
remain objective to be an important factor in imposing liability. Id. ~ 96,851 at 95,460.
In finding a duty of disclosure, the court conceded that most cases requiring disclosure
that were cited by the parties were different because they dealt with corporate insiders
trading in the corporation's stock. Id. ~ 96,851 at 95,460. However, the court found that a
number of cases were not so limited and extended the duty to nontraditional insiders. Id. ~
96,851 at 95,462 .
The court admitted that it was difficult to find a duty in traditional common-law
terms but concluded that liability was consistent with the letter and spirit of the securities
laws. Id . ~ 96,851 at 95,463. To reach that conclusio.n the court analogized the columnist to
the transfer agents in Affiliated Ute and concluded that a similar duty existed in each case.
The court also grounded its conclusion of a duty on the journalist's duty to his readers to
remain objective . Id. ~ 96,851 at 95,460-61.
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proposed rule 14e-2(c).1 10 Under that proposed rule a bidder who
determined to make a tender offer but had not yet publicly announced his decision would be subject to liability for nondisclosure.
Under the motive test a different result would' obtain; the offeror
would be liable only if he were acting to enhance personal gain.
In response to criticism of the proposed rule the SEC has withdrawn it. 111 As a result, the outcome under the suggested motive test
does not conflict with the SEC's present tender offer rules, which
permit the tender offeror to make preannouncement purchases and
restrict him only in that he may not disclose or leak the information
to anyone else whom he knows would similarly engage in preannouncement trading.
The withdrawal of the proposed rule imposing broad disclosure
obligations on the bidder appears to be proper. The rule did not take
sufficient account of the congressionally recognized value of tender
offers in achieving honest and fair management. 112 Provided no similar rule is ultimately adopted, the motive test should yield results
congruent with SEC tender-offer policy.
Another class of investors who would be able to rebut the presumption of liability under the motive test because of the presence
of a legitimate business objective would be the institutional investors, known as warehousers, who assist the tender offeror in financing a takeover bid. In warehousing 113 the tender offeror gives a bank
or other investor advance notice of his impending tender offer. On
the basis of that information the investor purchases stock of the
target, which then can serve as security for a loan to finance the
tender offer.11' This practice allows the offeror to obtain certain
financing which might otherwise be unavailable.11 5 Because the institutional investor does not use the information for personal gain,
it would be able to escape liability under the proposed test. 116
110. 44 Fed. Reg. 9,954, 9,988 (1979) .
111. Commentators pointed out that the proposed rule would discourage tender offers
by preventing the acquisition of negotiated block stock purchases as a prelude to what is
known as an "any and all" tender offer to all stockholders at the same price. Moreover,
commentators argued that since pre.offer purchases might be construed as a violation of the
rule, bidders would refrain from making any offers . [Current Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) ~ 82,373 at 82,598.
112. Id.
113. For a discussion of this practice, see SEC INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY REPORT,
H.R. Doc. No. 92-64, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 2773, 2828 (1971); Fleischer, An Initial Inquiry,
supra note 4, at 814; Comment, Market Insiders, supra note 103, at 1546.
114. See Comment, Market Insiders, supra note 103, at 1546.
115. See id.
116. In contrast, the SEC's proposed new tender offer rules would restrict the ability
of institutional investors to act as warehousers in financing a takeover bid in two ways . First,
the rules would proscribe any trading by a person other than the bidder who was in possession
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These proposed rules would operate to subject institutional
investors to a disclose-or-abstain rule and would effectively prevent
them from operating as interim financers for proposed takeovers.
The preannouncement purchases are what provide investors with
adequate security to make the loan on which the offer can proceed.
To require them to disclose or abstain from trading would put them
in the same position as all investors and effectively deprive them Of
the financial cushion on which to extend a loan. This comment
suggests that because the proposed rules would interfere with the
financing of tender offers and so with a major incentive for desirable
economic activity they should not be adopted in their present form.
Although the courts and the Commission, by their continuous
expansion of the scope of lOb-5, have reflected a belief in the importance of insuring equal access to investors, there are problems with
a test based on equal access and in some of the alternative standards
which have been proposed. The test based on the presence or absence of a motive to obtain personal profit goes to the heart of lOb5, which is a concern that depriving investors of equal access to
information can impair investor confidence and the capital markets.
The test focuses attention on what should be the main concern of
courts in determining whether there should be liability for nondisclosure of nonpublic information. It properly deemphasizes the importance of factors like status and type of information withheld
since these factors are unrelated to the impact on investor confidence. Moreover, the test is a workable one which gives courts a way
of ensuring that liability does not go too far. Finally, it gives the
courts a device for preserving desirable economic activity while ensuring fairness in the securities markets.
CONCLUSION

This comment has explored the problem of liability for nondisclosure of material information under rule lOb-5. Although the courts
and the Securities and Exchange Commission have confronted that
issue in numerous contexts, they have largely failed to articulate
clearly the principle explaining their continued expansion of the
scope of liability. Initially they grounded liability on common-law
concepts of fiduciary duty and status. When new situations arose
which called for disclosure, they found a duty to disclose by simply
expanding the reach of these concepts. In United States v. Chiarella
of information (material and nonpublic) relating to a tender by another person unless, prior
to such trading, the person publicly announced the information and its source. Second, the ·
rules would prohibit the offeror from divulging any material nonpublic information to any
person whom it had reason to believe would use the information to purchase stock.
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the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit abandoned this circuitous approach and clearly articulated a unifying principle underlying the duty of affirmative disclosure: assuring all investors equal
access to market information. This comment suggests that although
the explicit recognition of that principle is new, there is implicit
support for it in both the prior case law and legislative history.
This new recognition of equal access, however, provides only an
incomplete solution to the problem of defining the scope of liability
for nondisclosure because it is an inherently vague and open-ended
concept. To effectuate the principle the Second Circuit proposed a
test based on the regular receipt of market information. That test,
however, retains the disadvantages of the pre-Chiarella case law: it
focuses on the category of person and type of information and, as
formulated it could operate to prohibit even desirable economic
activity. This comment therefore suggests an alternative test to
effectuate the equal access principle based on motive or business
purpose, and urges its adoption.
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